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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Purge Vent and Drain Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, _nstructions
_or Preparation of FMEA and CIL, _0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
PV&D (Purge, Vent and Drain) Subsystem hardware.
The Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D) Subsystem controls the
environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities,
senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The
subsystem is divided into six systems. The systems and hardware
components which were analyzed are described below:
o Purge System - Controls the environment of unpressurized
structural compartments
- Ducts
- Flexible Joints
- Check Valves
o In-line
o Bulkhead
- Umbilical Disconnects
o vent System - Controls the pressure of unpressurized
compartments
- Vent Ports - Doors/Hinges
- Filters
o EMI Filters
o Contamination Filters
o Drain System - Removes water from unpressurized compartments
- Tubing/Couplings
- Quick Disconnects
o Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) - Monitors hazardous gas
concentrations
- Tubing/Couplings
- Quick Disconnects
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O Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) - Maintains clear
windows and provides pressure control of the window cavities
- Tubing/Debris Screen
- Desiccant/Filter Canisters
- Check Valves
- Quick Disconnects
O External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System - Prevents
cryo-pumping/icing of disconnect hardware
- Quick Disconnects
- Tubing
- Hoses/Orifices/Fittings/Seals
The IOA analysis process utilized available PV&D hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the six systems of the PV&D. A summary of the number of
failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with
Hardware (HW) criticaii£y first and Functional (F) criticality
second.
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Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality :
Number
1/I
4
2/IR
I0
2/2
2
3/IR 3/2R
J
3/3
46
TOTAL
62
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows: i
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality : i/I 2/iRi 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
Number : 4 i0 2 -- -- 16
Four (4) of the sixty--two (62) failure modes analyzed were
determined as single failures which could result in the loss of
crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any
of twelve (12) single failures occurred. Two (2) of the
criticality i/I failures are in the Window Cavity Conditioning
System (WCCS) outer window cavity, where leakage and/or
restricted flow will cause failure to depressurize/repressurize
the window cavity. Two (2) criticality I/I failures represent
leakage and/or restricted flow in the Orbiter/ET disconnect purge
network which prevent cryopumping/icing of disconnect hardware.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL revaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top--down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
revaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
5
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in--house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 PV&D Ground Rules and Assumptions
The PV&D ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
consistent with the project level ground rules and assumptions
contained in Appendix B.
J
g
z
U
mm
I
mm
!
q _ L l
m
m
.k
mR
=
i
B
i
m
i
_mm
m
mm
6
M
8UBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Design and Function
The PV&D subsystem consists of six (6) basic systems, the primary
function of which is the environment control of the Orbiter
unpressurized structural cavities. The six systems are described
in the following paragraphs.
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3.2 System Description
3.2.1 Purge System
The Orbiter Purge System services vehicle unpressurized
compartments, including the payload bay. The system is made up
of three circuits of on-board ducting that distributes purge gases
to and within the various compartments of the vehicle. Each
circuit has a separate interface at the starboard T--O
umbilical panel and functions during prelaunch and postlanding
operations for thermal, hazardous gas, moisture, and
contamination control. The three circuits are described below.
3.2.1.1 Circuit One - services the Orbital Maneuvering System
(OMS) Pods, vertical stabilizer, wings, cabin annulus, forward
Reaction Control System (RCS) and Star Tracker. It is equipped
with check valves to prevent cross flow of gases during ascent
and descent.
3.2.1.2 Circuit Two -- services the lower midbody equipment bay
and the payload bay. Three special capped outlets are
incorporated in the system and are available for internal purging
or conditioning of payloads.
3.2.1.3 Circuit Three - services the aft body engine
compartment. This circuit provides a dedicated flow to the three
main engine controllers and a bulk area dedicated conditioning
flow. Additional bulk area conditioning flow is provided by flow
from the "Circuit Two" system. This flow enters the aft body
through 14 check valves.
3.2.2 Vent System
The Orbiter Vent System provides ascent venting and descent
repressurization of unpressurized Orbiter compartments to
maintain differential pressures within Orbiter structural limits.
The vent ports provide outlets for ground purging and on-orbit
molecular venting of compartments containing thermal insulation.
The vent ports also minimize the effects of entry heating and
repressurization on the vehicle structure either by maintaining
the vent doors closed during the high heating phase of the flight
or by using heat sinks. To accomplish these tasks the Orbiter
uses the following three designs.
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O Electronically actuated vent doors (forward RCS, forward
fuselage plenum, mid fuselage, wings, aft fuselage/vertical
fin and OMS pods)
O Passive vents (open holes)with heat sinks for thermal
protection (rudders/speed break, elevons/elevon cavity)
o Self--vented compartments which freely vent (nose cap, wing
leading edge, body flap)
The active vent system consists of eighteen electromagnetically
actuated doors. The actuators are designed to meet fail-safe
requirements through the use of dual 3-phase AC motors,
independently powered, connected through a differential and slip
clutch to bell cranks, linkages and torque shafts. Vent door
positions are monitored by redundant limit switches which
indicate open, closed, and purge positions.
The sequence of the active vent sys£em is contr0iled
automatically by the launch pr0cesslng System for prelaunch
sequencing and the Orbiter general purpose computers during
ascent and descent phases. Manual sequencing capability
via CRT is required for de--orbit and post-landing operations.
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3.2.3 Drain System
The Drain System consists of passive "through-hole" and active
"vacuum line" systems. The two systems are described below.
3.2.3.1 Passive System - consists of dedicated drain holes and
flow paths in selected structures which provide vertical or
vertical and h0riz0n£al gravitydraina_e.
3.2.3.2 Active System - consists of three separate circuits
which service the forward fuselage plenum and forward RCS nose
wheel well compartments. The forward fuselage plenum drain line
is used in the horizontal mode, while the forward RCS and nose
wheel well drain lines are used primarily in the vertical mode.
The active drain system consists of 3/8--inch--diameter braz@d
stainless steel lines that extend from the low point within the
compartment serviced to a disc0nnect located for easy
servicability during ground operations.
3.2.4 Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS)
monomethylhydrazine, nitrogen tetroxide, and hydrazine) in
selected vehicle compartments (forward RCS fuselage, payload bay,
landlng and safing opera£ions_ GSE hypergoliCmeisurementprobes
are mounted external to the vehicle to monitor purge effluent
from the FWD RCS, OMS/RCS Pods, and aft fuselage vents_ The
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cryogenic system consist of I/5 inch diameter stainless steel
tubing vacuum lines connected to a GSE mass spectrometer. The
interface between the on-board tubing and GSE is thru the T--O
disconnect, therefore, the aft fuselage, payload bay, Lower Mid
Fuselage (LMF), and ET intertank area are monitored to lift-off.
3.2.5 Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS)
The WCCS prevents contamination (e.g. fog, frost, Volatile
Condensable Material (VCM)) and window glass overpressurization
and provides necessary fail-safe redundancy. The system is
divided into eight smaller systems each with its own purge and
vent circuits. The systems are as follows:
o Port front and middle outer windshields
o Starboard front and middle outer windshields
o Port outer windshield and overhead window
o Starboard outer windshield and overhead window
o Port inner window cavities
o Starboard inner window cavities
o Side hatch outer cavity
o Side hatch inner cavity
The vent circuit of each system is equipped with a
desiccant/filter canister. The canister removes moisture,
particulates, and VCM contamination from pressurization gases. If
the outer canisters fail to flow properly, check valves, working
in parallel, provide redundancy. The WCCS is connected by 1/4 to
I inch brazed stainless steel tubing. WCCS LRUs are joined to
the tubing with Dynatube--fittings.
3.2.6 External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System
The External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System provides helium
to the LH 2 side and gaseous nitrogen to the LO 2 side of the
disconnec£s to prevent cryo-pumping (liquefaction of air) and
icing within the:
o frangible nut canisters
o gap between the disconnect plates
o electrical feed-through cavity, including the ET wire shrouds
=
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The purge gas maintains a positive pressure (P is greater than
or equal to 0.i0 PSID) in the above volumes during prelaunch
operations under cryogenic conditions to prevent back diffusion
of air and the resulting cryo-pumping and/or ice formation.
The purge gas is introduced to the circuit by GSE through a T--O
umbilical disconnect and is ducted to the ET/Orbiter disconnect
compartment via an on--board tubing circuit.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the PV&D subsystem.
Figures 3 thru 8 illustrate the system and corresponding
subassemblies of the PV&D system.
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Figure 2 -- PV&D SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 3 -- PURG_ SYS_
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Figure 4 -- VENT SYSTEM
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the six (6) systems of
of the PV&D subsystem. Further discussion of each of these
systems and the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent
paragraphs of this section.
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TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTALCriticality:
Purge System
HGDS
Drain System
WCCS
Vent System
ET/ORB Discn.
TOTAL
m
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2
4
m
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14
4
5
12
8
3
46
14
4
5
2O
14
5
62
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Four (4) of the sixty--two (62) failure modes analyzed were
determined to be single failures which could result in loss of
crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any
of twelve (12) single failures occurred. A summary of the potential
critical items is presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a
cross--reference between each potential critical item (PCI) and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
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TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality: i/1 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
Purge System
HGDS
Drain System
WCCS
Vent System
ET/ORB Discn.
Total
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4.4
4.5
4.6
Analysis Results - Purge System
There are fourteen (14) failure modes identified for the
Purge System all of which are identified as criticality 3/3.
Analysis Results -- Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS)
There are four (4) failure modes identified for the HGDS all
of which are determined to be criticality 3/3.
Analysis Results -- Drain System
There are five (5) failure modes identified for the Drain
System all of which are determined to be criticality 3/3.
Analysis Results - Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS)
There are twenty (20) failure modes identified for the WCCS.
Of these, two (2) are criticality I/i, four (4) are
criticality 2/IR, two (2) are criticality 2/2, and twelve
(12) are criticality 3/3. Eight (8) failures are identified
as PCIs. These PCIs are listed in Appendix D.
Analysis Results -- Vent System
There are fourteen (14) failure modes identified for the
Vent System. Of these, six (6) are criticality 2/IR, and
eight (8) are criticality 3/3. Six (6) failures are
identified as PCIs. These PCIs are listed in Appendix D.
Analysis Results -- ET/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System
There are five (5) failure modes identified for the
ET/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System. Of these, two (2) are
criticality I/I, and three (3) are criticality 3/3. Two (2)
failures are identified as PCIs. These PCIs are listed in
Appendix D.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
w
AOA
ATO
CIL
CRIT
CWS
ECLSS
EPDC
EPG
ET
FC
FCP
FMEA
FSSR
GAS
GPC
GSE
HDC
IOA
MDAC
MDM
NA
NASA
NSTS
OF
OMRSD
OMS
PCA
PCI
PLS
PRCB
PRSDS
PSA
PV&D
RCS
RI
RPC
RTLS
STS
TAL
TCS
VCM
WCCS
WRS
- Abort-Once-Around
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Critical items List
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning System
- Environmental Control and Life Support System
(Subsystem)
- Electrical Power, Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Generator
- External Tank
- Fuel Cell
- Fuel Cell Power (Plant)
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Get-Away Special
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Forward
- Operational Maintenance Requirements &
Specifications Document
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Primary Landing Site
- Program Requirements Control Board
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
- Power Section Assembly
- Purge Vent & Drain
- Reaction Control System
- Rockwell International
- Remote Power Controller
- Return-to-Landing Site
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thermal Control System (Subsystem)
- Volatile Condensable Material
- Window Cavity Conditioning System
- Water Removal Subsystem
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 2_206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
qQNT_NGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
_FF_CTS/R_TIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(Pus)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCeDUReS - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISS_0N _HASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SA_NG PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions for
Preparation o$ FMEA/CIL, _0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
i
i
B
•
•
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task•
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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II.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
w
Ires
B-5
iUm
l
l
IB
II
Ill
II
m
i
i
gl
mim
II
II
g
II
il
I
l
II
i
I
APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the DPS subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's written by
Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets identifies the item
being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well as the function. For
each failure mode, the possible causes are outlined, and the
assessed hardware and functional criticality for each mission
phase is listed, as described in the Rockwe_ D@sk _nstruct_ons
100-2G. Finally, effects are entered at the bottom of each
sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered at the top.
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LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
1
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 = Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO CONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HiE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
PURGE SYSTEM
UMBILICAL DISCONNECTS (3)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFe,G:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /
/ TAL: /
/ AOA: /
/ ATO: /
3/3
_D_DANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION: T-O UMBILICAL
PART NUMBER: MC276-0029
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, WEARING, CHAFING
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE PURGE GAS FROM GSE THRO_HJTHE
UMBILICAL TO ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS. LOSS OF CAPABILITY
TO_Y OF TH_REESEPARATE COMPARTMENTS (3 SEPARATE DISCONNECTS) TO
PROVIDE HGD, THERMAL, AND MOISTURE CONTROL DURING PRELAUNCH
AND POST-LANDING ACTIVITY. POTENTIAL EFFECT ON PAYLOAD/ORBITER
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT DUE TO LOSS OF THERMAL CONDITIONING AND HGD
REMOVAL_
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REFERENCES: VC70-000006, SD72-SH-0101-5, V070-385011
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/2o/87
PV&D
9002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
FAILS TO DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
PV&D
PURGE SYSTEM
UMBILICAL DISCONNECTS (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
T-O UMBILICAL
MC276-0029
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UMBILICALS UTILIZED DURING GROUND OPERATION PRE-LIFT OFF AND
POST-LANDING TO PROVIDE PURGE GAS FOR 3 SEPARATE PURGE CRICUITS.
UMBILICAL DISCONNECTED AT T-O RETRACTION. DISCONNECTS HELD
TOGETHER BY MOUNTING PLATES, NO MECHANICAL CONNECTIONS.
FAILURE TO DISCONNECT IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
REFERENCES: VC70-000006, SD72"SH-0101-5, V070-385011
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
PV&D
9003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
PURGE SYSTEM
UMBILICAL DISCONNECTS (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
T-O UMBILICAL
MC276-0029
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UMBILICAL LEAKAGE WILL PROVIDE PARTIAL FLOW OF N2 AND/OR AIR TO
THE ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARMENTS CAUSING DEGRADED PURGE
CAPABILITY. ITEM USED ONLY DURING GROUND OPERATIONS FOR
HAZARDOUS GAS DILUTION, THERMAL CONTROL AND MOISTURE CONTROL.
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REFERENCES: VC70-000006, V070-385011
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/29/87
PV&D
9004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE, UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) PURGE SYSTEM
3) UMBILICAL DISCONNECTS
4) VALVE (3)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NT/MBER:
T-O UMBILICAL
MC276-0029
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE FAILURE WILL PREVENT THE INDUCTION OF PURGE GAS INTO
ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS. THE ABSENCE OF PURGE GAS
PRE/POST-FLIGHT WILL PREVENT THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE ORBITER
AVIONICS AND PAYLOADS WITH THERMAL CONDITIONING, MOISTURE
CONTROL, HAZARDOUS GAS DILUTION IN THE AFFECTED ORBITER
COMPARTMENTS.
REFERENCES: VC70-000006, V070-385011
u
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/Ol/87
PV&D
9005
HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
VALe, _BILICAL DISCO_E_
FAI_ TO _IN C_SED
_AD ANALYST: P. BY_ SUBSYS _AD: P. BY_
B__ HIE_CHY:
i) PV&D
2) P_GE SYSTEM
3) _BILICAL DISCO_ECTS
4) VAL_ (3)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_DANCY S_ENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_TION: T-O _BILICAL
P_T _ER: MC276-0029
CAUSES: CO_INATION, SPRING FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TION_: .............
FAIL_ OF THE ORBITER INTE_ACE AT THE _BILICAL DISCO_ECT WILL
AL_W P_SS__DIFFE_NTIAL,o D_ING ASCENT ! AND HOT GAS INGESTION
D_ING _Y, POS_B_D_j_QY T_ P_GE DUCTING. THE DESIGN
OF THE DISCO_ECT IS FAIT._.D C_SED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/01/87
PV&D
9006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) PURGE SYSTEM
3 ) CHECK VALVE (7)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME284-0484
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, WEARING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHECK VALVE FAILURE PRODUCES PARTIAL LOSS OF PURGE GAS FLOW AND
HGD DILUTION. IN ADDITION, ORBITER NON-PRESSURIZED COMPARTMENT
ISOLATION SHALL BE VIOLATED AND ALLOWANCE OF REVERSE FLOW OF HGD
IS ALSO PROBABLE. THE CHECK VALVE IS INTERNALLY REDUNDANT,
DUAL FAILURE IS REQUIRED FOR TOTAL VALVE FAILURE.
REFERENCES: ME284-0484
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYST_:
mAC ID:
8/ol/87
PV&D
9007
HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
FLIG_:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITS:
FAIL_ MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAI_ TO _MAIN C_SED, FAI_ TO C_SE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
B__ HIE_CHY :
I) PV&D
2) PURGE SYSTEM
3) CHECK VAL_ (7)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C A_RT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEO_IT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] ........
_CATION:
P_T _BER: ME284-0484
CAUSES: CO_INATION, PIECE-P_T FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIO_:
VAL_ FAIL_ TO C_SE PRODUCES _E _SS OF O_ITER NON-
PRESURIZED S_UC_L CO__ ISO_TIONAL_WI_GH_F_W
BE_EN COMP_NTS, PRESSS_ DIFFERE_IAL AND THERMAL
CONDITIONING _SS DURING _NT OPE_TIONS.
_FE_NCES: ME284-0484
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/Ol/87
PV&D
9008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) PV&D
2) PURGE SYSTEM
3) CHECK VALVE (7)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME284-0484
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE LEAKAGE WILL DEGRADE THE INTEGRITY OF ISOLATING ORBITER NON
PRESSURIZED STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS, ALLOWING MINOR HGD FLOW
BETWEEN COMPARTMENTS.
u REFERENCES: ME284-0484
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/Ol/87
PV&D
9009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2 ) PURGE SYSTEM
3 ) CHECK VALVE (7)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME284-0484
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE DESIGN DUCTS LEAKAGE TO THE DOWNSTREAM SIDE OF VALVE.
RATE AND COMPARTMENT ISOLATION RETAINED.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
FLOW
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9010 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2 ) PURGE SYSTEM
3 ) CHECK VALVE (14 )
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
1307 BLKHD
ME284-0484
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORRISION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHECK VALVE PROVIDE PURGE AND VENT OF THE PAYLOAD BAY THROUGH THE
1307 BLKHD AND 6 OF THE 14 VALVES PROVIDE HGD MONITORING.
FAILURE OF VALVE TO OPEN/REMAIN OPEN WILL NOT PREVENT PURGE, VENT
OR HGD. REDUNDANT VALVES WILL CONTINUE SATISFACTORY
OPERATIONS/FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: V070-385011
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) PURGE SYSTEM
3 ) CHECK VALVE (14)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
1307 BLKHD
ME284-0484
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHECK VALVE FAILURE WILL VIOLATE THE INTEGRITY OF PAY_LOAD BAY AND
AFT coMP-ART_NT STRUCTURAL ISOLATION. THE EFFECTS ARE HGD FLOW
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FROM EACH COMPARTMENT TO THE OTHER AND PRESSURE DIFFERENTIALS DUE
TO VENTING DURING ASCENT/DECENT.
REFERENCES: V070-3850ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9012 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) PV&D
2 ) PURGE SYSTEM
3) CHECK VALVES (14)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
1307 BLKHD
ME284-0484
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE WILL VIOALTE ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT
ISOLATION ALLOWING MINIMAL HGD FLOW BETWEEN COMPARTMENTS AND
DELTA PRESSURE IN STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS.
REFERENCES: V070-385011
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUCTING/FLEXIBLE BELLOWS/STRAPS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) PV&D
2 ) PURGE SYSTEM
3 ) DUCTING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: / .......
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-384011, ME277-0015, ME277-0009, NAS1922
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERA_, VIBRATION
EFFE TS/ TIONALE :.............................................
LEAKAGE IN THE PURGE DUCTING NETWORK WILL DEGRADE PURGE GAS
SUPPLY TO THE ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS. LEAKAGE MAY OCCUR
AT DUCT JOINTS SECURED BY STEEL STRAPS AND FLEXIBLE BELLOWS
INTERFACES. LEAKAGE WILL HAMPER HGD DILUTION, THERMAL
CONTROL, AND MOISTURE CONTROL IN ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS.
REFERENCES: ME277-009, V070-382011, V070-384050
m
mm
mm
z
ms
z
m
m
[]
l
m
z
ms
m
m
B
m
mm
m
[]
mm
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-14
m
[]
rINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9014 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DUCTING
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOG
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) PURGE SYSTEM
3) DUCTING
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
/ TAL: 3/3
/ AOA: 3/3
/ ATO: 3/3
3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-384011, ME277-0015, ME277-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PURGE DUCTING CLOGS WILL DEGRADE PURGE MEDIA FLOW IN ORBITER
STURCTURAL cOMPAR_NTS. PURGE ?LUID FILTRATION iS_PROVIDED PRE-
INTRODUCTION TO ORBITER. PURGE DUCTING CLOG IS NOT A VIABLE
FAILURE MODE.
REFERENCES- V070-382011, V070-384050
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9015 ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
FAILS TO CONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) HGDS
3) UMBILICAL DISCONNECT (3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: T-O DISCONNECT PANEL
PART NUMBER: MC276-0021
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION
B [ ] C [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIO_NALE :
FAILURE TO _ CONNECT WIlL __T_'_ D'ETECTION ___THE _ _
PAYLOAD BAY AND AFT/FWD FUSELAGE DURING P_LAUNCH AND POST
_DiNG OPERATIONS. THIS FAILURE CAN BE CORRECTED DURING GROUND
OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: MC276-0021, V070-385071
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9016 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) HGDS
3) UMBILICAL DISCONNECT (3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: T-O UMBILICAL PANEL
PART NUMBER: MC276-0021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE WILL DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF THE HGDS GSE DETECTION
HARDWARE TO MONITOR HGDS SAMPLES ACCURATELY DUE TO THE DILUTION
OF SAMPLES BY THE SURROUNDING ATMOSPHERE.
REFERENCES: MC276-0021, V070-385071
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9017 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PIPING
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) HGDS
3) PIPING (3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE, PLD BAY, FWD RCS FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-385070
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CLOGS IN THE HGDS .25 INCH TUBING WILL DEGRADE/PREVENT THE
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR/ANALYZE HAZARDOUS GAS IN THE AFT/FWD
FUSELAGE, PAYLOAD BAY, AND/OR MID FUSELAGE, DEPENDING ON WHICH OF
THE 3 LINES IN CLOGGED.
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REFERENCES". V070-385070
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PIPING
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) PV&D
2) HGDS
3) PIPING (3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-3855070
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE/BREAK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HGDS SAMPLE LINES ARE 1/4 INCH, .016 THICK STAINLESS STEEL
TUBING. THE COUPLINGS ARE INDICTiON-BRAZED SLEE_/E JOINTS,
THEREFORE LEAKAGE IS NOT A VIABLE FAILURE.
REFERENCES: V070-3855070
w
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9019 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECT
FAIL TO CONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
3) QUICK DISCONNECT (3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
mmm
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CRITICALITIES m
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: / U
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 i
B [ ] C [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: m
PART NUMBER: MC261-0038
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMPONENT FAILURE TO CONNECT WILL ALLOW MOISTURE TO REMAIN IN
ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS. THE GSE ASPIRATOR USED DURING
GROUND OPERATION COULD NOT BE ATTACHED TO VEHICLE TO DRAIN
ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS.
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REFERENCES: V070-382051
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9020 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECT
FAIL TO DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) PWD
2) DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
3) QUICK DISCONNECT (3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO DISCONNECT WILL NOT ALLOW SEPERATION OF GSE ASPIRATOR
FROM THE ORBITER DRAIN SUBSYSTEM IN ORDER FOR FLIGHT PREPARATION.
THE DISCONNECT IS USED ONLY FOR GROUND OPERATIONS AND CAN BE
MANUALLY REMOVED PRIOR TO LAUNCH/COUNTDOWN.
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=
REFERENCES: V070-382051
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 902!
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECT ....
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
PV&D
DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
QUICK DISCONNECT (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WILL IMPACT THE AMOUNT OF TIME REQUIRED TO DRAIN
ORBITER STRUCTRAL COMPARTMENT. DRAINAGE ONLY REQUIRED DURING
GROUND OPERATION, THEREFORE NO IMPACT TO MISSION/FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: V070-382051
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9022 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBING
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
3) TUBING (3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-382051
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CLOGGED DRAIN TUBING WILL SLOW/PREVENT DRAINAGE OF ORBITER
STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENTS. LOSS OF DRAINAGE CAPABILITY OCCURS
DURING GROUND OPERATIONS, WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR CORRECTION PRIOR
TO LAUNCH/COUNTDOWN.
REFERENCES: VC70-000008
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REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9023 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBING
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
B__ HIE_CHY:
I) PV&D
2) D_IN SUBSYSTEM
3) TUBING (3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-382051
CAUSES: LOOSE JOINTS/FITTINGS
B[ ] C[ ]
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF D_INAGE TUBING WOULD OC_ D_ING GROUND OPE_TIONS .... i
ONLY, MEN THE GSE SYSTEMWOULDD_W FLUIDS T_U THE TUBING_ _
TUBING IS 3/8 INCH STAINLESS STEEL WITH DYNATUBE AND B_ZED
JOINTS. JOINT LEDGE IS NOT A PROBABLE FAIL_.
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REFERENCES: VC70-000008
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9024 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT
FAIL TO CONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3) GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT (8)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, WEARING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO CONNECT THE GROUND SUPPLIED PURGE GAS NETWORK TO THE
WINDOW CAVITY PURGE SYSTEM CAUSES LOSS OF CONTROL OF ORBITER
WINDOW ENVIRONMENT PRODUCING CONDENSATION AND CONTAMINATION
LIMITING VISIBILITY. SYSTEM IS ONLY UTILIZED DURING GROUND
OPERATION, WHICH ALLOWS FOR FIX OR REPLACEMENT OF DEFECTIVE
COMPONENT.
REFERENCES: VC70-38071
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REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT
FAIL TO DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
g
D
I
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) WCCS
3) GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT (8)
4) w
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO DISCONNECT THE GROUND SUPPLIED PURGE GAS NETWORK FROM
THE ORBITER WINDOW CAVITY PURGE SYSTEM WILL PREVENT WINDOW
CONFIGURATION FOR FLIGHT. FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED AND CORRECTED
DURING PRE-LAUNCH OPS.
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REFERENCES: VC70-38071
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9026 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) WCCS
3) GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT (8)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOOSE FITTINGS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE WILL AFFECT AMOUNT OF PURGE GAS SUPPLIED TO THE WCCS.
OPERATION OCCURS DURING GROUND TURNAROUND ACTIVITY, LEAKAGE CAN
BE REPAIRED, NO IMPACT TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VC70-38071
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9027 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ASCENT RELIEF VA_LVE _.......
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAI_ TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3 ) ASCENT RELIEF VALVE (5)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: / ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0437
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
VALUE OPERATION IS ONLY REQUIRED WHEN DESICCANT/FI_T_ER±_S
FAILED. -VAL_ FA_LU_WILL AL_W PRESSURE TO BUILD ACROSS THE
OUTER CAVITY WINDOW PANEL WITH POTENTIAL THERMAL PANE RUPTURE.
REFERENCES: VC70-383121
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-28
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ASCENT RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3) ASCENT RELIEF VALVE (5)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0437
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE FAILURE WILL DEGRADE THE OUTER WINDOW CAVITY PRESSURE AND
ALLOW CONTAMINANTS AND CONDENSATES TO ENTER WHICH _Y CAUSE
WINDOW FOGGING. WINDOWS HAVE SEPARATE SYSTEMS ALLOWING VEHICLE
OPERATION FROM RIGHT OR LEFT WINDOWS.
REFERENCES: VC70-383121
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9029 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ASCENT RELIEF VALVE
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2 ) WCCS
3) ASCENT RELIEF VALVE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0437
] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE WILL DEGRADE wccs PURGE NETWORK AND ATMOSPHERE IN THE
O_ W_-D_Dw CAVITY'_CH _Y_W_%_NDOW _FOGGING_
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REFERENCES: V070-383121
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9030 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3) DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOk: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0437
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE FAILURE WILL DEGRADE THE OUTER WINDOW CAVITY PRESSURE AND
ALLOW CONTAMINANTS AND CONDENSATES TO ENTER WHICH MAY CAUSE
WINDOW FOGGING. WINDOWS HAVE SEPARATE SYSTEMS ALLOWING VEHICLE
OPERATION FROM RIGHT OR LEFT WINDOWS.
REFERENCES: VC70-383121
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9031 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3 ) DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0437
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE OPERATION IS ONLY REQUIRED WHEN DESICCANT/FILTER HAS __
FAII_Eb. ......VALVE _ FAILURE WI£L ALLOW PRESS_ETO:BUILD ACROSS THE
OUTER CAVITY WINDOW PANEL AND MAY CAUSE THERMAL PANE RUPTURE.
REFERENCES: VC70-383121
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=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9032 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) WCCS
3) DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0437
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE WILL DEGRADE WCCS PURGE NETWORK AND ATMOSPHERE IN THE
OUTER WINDOW CAVITY WHICH MAY ALLOW WINDOW FOGGING.
u
REFERENCES: VC70-383121
i
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 9033 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: DESICCANT/FILTER OUTER CAVITY
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
m
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mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: u
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3) DESICCANT/FILTER (7)
4) "
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: OUTER WINDOW CAVITY
PART NUMBER: V070-381120
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL EFFECT THE PRIMAR__Y COT_INATION CONTROL ELEMENT AND
VENTi_ CAPAB_ILIT_Y _0R _S_NT ?.EPR_;_E _D _ DESCENT _SSURE.
BYPASS VALVE BACKUP PROVIDED FOR PRESSURE RELIEF, WINDOW CAVITY
FOGGING MAY OCCUR DUE TO LACK OF CONTAMINATION
CONTROL/PURGE CAPABILITY. FILTER CHECK/REPLACED BEFORE/AFTER
EACH MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-381140
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9034 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DESICCANT/FILTER OUTER CAVITY
RESTRICTED FLOW, SATURATES
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) PWD
2) wccs
3) DESICCANT/FILTER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
/ AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OUTER WINDOW CAVITY
V070-381120
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MOISTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL EFFECT THE PRIMARY CONTAMINATION CONTROL ELEMENT AND
VENTING CAPABILITY FOR ASCENT REPRESSURE AND DESCENT DEPRESSURE.
BYPASS VALVE BACKUP PROVIDED FOR PRESSURE RELIEF, WINDOW CAVITY
FOGGING MAY OCCUR DUE TO LACK OF CONTAMINATION
CONTROL/PURGE CAPABILITY. FILTER CHECK/REPLACED BEFORE/AFTER
EACH MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-381140
m
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 9035 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: DESICCANT/FILTER OUTER CAVITY
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
mmm
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BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : m
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3 ) DESICCANT/FILTER
4)
5)
6)
7) j
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OUTER WINDOW CAVITY
PART NUMBER: V070-381120
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOOSE FITTINGS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL EFFECT THE PRIMARY CONTAMINATION CONTROL ELEMENT AND
VENTING CAPABILITY FORASCENT REPRESSURE AND DESCENT DEPRESSURE.
BYPASS VALVE BACKUP PROVIDED FOR PRESSURE RELIEF, WINDOW CAVITY
FOGGING MAY OCCUR DUE TO LACK OF CONTAMINATION
CONTROL/PURGE CAPABILITY.
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REFERENCES: V070-381140
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9036 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBING
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) WCCS
3) TUBING, OUTER CAVITY
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF : i/1 TAL : I/1
ONORBIT : / AOA : i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
•LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-382164, V070-381071
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLOGS OF TUBING NETWORK WILL RESTRICT THE PURGE GAS FLOW DURING
GROUND TURNAROUND AND DE_q%ADETHE CAPABILITYOF WINDOW CAVITY
VENTING REPRESSURIZATION DURING ASCENT AND DEPRESSURIZATION
DURING DESCENT. POSSIBLE THERMAL PANE RUPTURE.
REFERENCES: V070-384026
u
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-37
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/01/87
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT : i/1
ABORT : i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
i
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BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
atom
I) PV&D
2) wccs
3) TUBING, OUTER CAVITY
4)
s)
6)
7) m
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF : i/1 TAL : 1-/1
ONORBIT : / AOA : 1/1
DEORBIT : 1/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: /
B[ ] C[ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
V070-382164, V070-381071
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOOSE FITTINGS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF TUBING NE_O_W!_L DEGRADETHE ABILIT_=QF_C_
CONTAMINATION AND MOISTURE CONTROL. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CABIN
PRESSURE DUE TO WINDOW CAVITY PURGE LINE LEAKAGE. INCREASED
DELTA PRESSURE ON OUTER WINDOW CAVITY AND HATCH WINDOW.
POSSIBLE THERMAL PANE RUPTURE.
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REFERENCES: V070-384026
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9038 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DESICCANT/FILTER
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) wccs
3) DESICCANT/FILTER
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HATCH WINDOW
V070-381120
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL EFFECT THE PRIMARY CONTAMINATION CONTROL ELEMENT AND
VENTING CAPABILITY FOR ASCENT REPRESSURE AND DESCENT DEPRESSURE.
BYPASS VALVE BACKUP PROVIDED FOR PRESSURE RELIEF, WINDOW CAVITY
FOGGING MAY OCCUR DUE TO LACK OF CONTAMINATION
CONTROL/PURGE CAPABILITY. FILTER CHECK/REPLACED BEFORE/AFTER
EACH MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-381140
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/01/87
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DESICCANT/FILTER, INNER WINDOW
RESTRICTED FLOW, SATURATED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) PV&D
2) wccs
3) DESICCANT/FILTER
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
INNER WINDOW CAVITY
V070-381120
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, EXCESS MOISTURE
EFFECTS/_T!ONALE:
FAILURE WILL EFFECT THE PRIMARY coNT_INATION CONTR6L_ELEMENT,
VENTING CAPABILITY FOR ASCENT REPRESSURE AND DESCENT DEPRESSURE,
AND THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE PURGE GAS TO THE WINDOW CAVITY.
FOGGING MAY OCCUR DUE TO LACK OF CONTAMINATION CONTROL/PURGE
CAPABILITY. FILTER CHECK/REPLACED BEFORE/AFTER EACH MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-381140
romp
I
i
m
E
i
ms
law
m
m
mm
z
m
m
m
I
mp
i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9040 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DESICCANT/FILTER, INNER WINDOW
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) WCCS
3) DESICCANT/FILTER
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
INNER WINDOW CAVITY
V070-381120
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, EXCESS MOISTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL EFFECT THE PRIMARY CONTAMINATION CONTROL ELEMENT,
VENTING CAPABILITY FOR ASCENT REPRESSURE AND DESCENT DEPRESSURE,
AND THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE PURGE GAS TO THE WINDOW CAVITY.
FOGGING MAY OCCUR DUE TO LACK OF CONTAMINATION CONTROL/PURGE
CAPABILITY. FILTER CHECK/REPLACED BEFORE/AFTER EACH MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-381140
w
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9041 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DESICCANT/FILTER, INNER WINDOW
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3) DESICCANT/FILTER
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
/ AOA:
3/3 ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION: INNER WINDOW CAVITY
PART NUMBER: V070-381120
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOOSE FITTINGS
EFFECTS/RATIONA_LE_ ..............
FAIL_U_._WILL=EFF_HE PRIMARY CONTAMINATION CONTR__NT,
VENTING CAPABILITY FOR ASCENT REPRESSURE _d_D DESCENT DEPRESSURE,
AND THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE PURGE GAS TO THE WINDOW CAVITY.
FOGGING MAY OCCUR DUE TO LACK OF CONTAMINATION CONTROL/.P_GE
CAPABILITY. FILTER CHECK/REPLACED BEFORE/AFTER EACH MISSION.
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REFERENCES: V070-381140
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9042 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBING
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) wccs
3) TUBING, INNER CAVITY
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-381256, V070-383102
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CLOGS OF TUBING NETWORK WILLRESTRICT THE PURGE GAS FLOW DURING
GROUNDTURNAROUND AND DEGRADE THECAPABILITY OF WINb6W-CAVITY
VENTING REPRESSURIZATION DURING ASCENT AND DEPRESSURIZATION
DURING DESCENT. CLOGS SHOULD BE DETECTED DURING GROUND TURN
AROUND. POSSIBLE LOSS/DEGRADATION OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-43
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9043 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2_
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) wccs
3) TUBING, INNER CAVITY
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-38400, V070-381300
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOOSE FITTINGS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LE_AI_AGE bf _-N_NETW0_ WiLL ..............DEGRADE THE ABI--Li_Y°D?WCCSI_ _
CONTAMINATION AND MOISTURE CONTROL. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CABIN
PRESSURE DUE TO INNER WINDOW CAVITY PURGE LINE LEAKAGE.
INCREASED DELTA PRESSURE ON INNER WINDOW CAVITY.
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REFERENCES: VL70-003324 m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9044 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR ASSEMBLY, FORWARD FUSELAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) PV&D
2 ) VENT SYSTEM
3) DOOR ASSEMBLY (i, 2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RCS FWD, FWD FUSELAGE PLENUM
PART NUMBER: V070-380308
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VENT DOOR ASSEMBLY HINGE BINDING WILL PREVENT ORBITER STRUCTURAL
COMPARTMENT VENTING, PRESSURIZATION/REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY.
FAILURE OF ALL VENT DOORS AssOCIATEDWITHIN THIS SPECIFIC
STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT LOCATION WILL PERMIT STRUCTURAL STRESS
AND POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
m
REFERENCES". ME621-0043, V070-381031
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-45
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9105187
PV&D
9045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR ASSEMBLY, FORWARD FUSELAGE
INTERNALIEXTE_AL LEA_GE ....
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
B W. HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) VENT SYSTEM
3) DOOR ASSEMBLY (1,2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: RCS FWD, FWD FUSELAGE PLENUM
PART NUMBER: V070-380308
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, SEAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3 .
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: .....
VENT DOOR LEAKAGE WILL ALLOW ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT
PRESSURE DEGRADATION AND POSSIBLE HOT GAS ENTRY DURING
ASCENT/DEORBIT, WITH POSSIBLE THERMAL DAMAGE TO DOOR AND DUCTING.
FUNCTIONAL EFFECT OF LEAKAGE SHOUDD_ _ _MINI_T_ Q _NT SYSTEM
OPERATION AND ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT INTEGRITY.
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REFERENCES: ME621-0043, V070-381031
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9046 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR ASSEMBLY, PAYLOAD BAY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
VENT SYSTEM
DOOR ASSEMBLY (3, 5, 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
V070-384031
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VENT DOOR ASSEMBLY HINGE BINDING WILL PREVENT ORBITER STRUCTURAL
COMPARTMENT VENTING, PRESSURIZATION/REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY.
FAILURE OF ALL VENT DOORS ASSOCIATED WITHIN THIS SPECIFIC
STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT _CATiON WILL PERMIT STRUC_L STRESS
AND POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL (BULKHEAD) FAILURE.
REFERENCES: ME621-0043, V070-384031
= REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9047 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR ASSEMBLY, PAYLOAD BAY
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE .....
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
VENT SYSTEM
DOOR ASSEMBLY (3, 5, 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
V070-384031
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VENT DOOR LEAKAGE WILL ALLOW ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT
PRESSURE DEGRADATION AND POSSIBLE HOT GA_ ENTRY DURING
ASCENT/DEORBIT, WITH POSSIBLE THERMAL DAMAGE TO DOOR AND DUCTING.
FUNCTIONAL EFFECT OF LEAKAGE SHOULD BE MINIMUM TO VENT SYSTEM
OPERATION AND ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT INTEGRITY.
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REFERENCES: ME621-0043, V070-384031
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9048 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR ASSEMBLY, WINGS AND MID FUSELAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) VENT SYSTEM
3) DOOR ASSEMBLY (4, 7)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ]
LOWER MID FUSELAGE (LMF), PLD BAY
V070-384031
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VENT DOOR ASSEMBLY HINGE BINDING WILL PREVENT ORBITER STRUCTURAL
COMPARTMENT VENTING, PRESSURIZATiON/REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY.
FAILURE OF ALLVENT DOORS ASSOCIATED WITHIN THIS SPECIFIC
STRUCTURAL COMPAR_NT LOCATION WILL PERMIT STRUCTURAL STRESS
AND POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL (WINGS, LMF) FAILURE.
REFERENCES: ME621-0043, V070-384031
w
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9049 ABORT:
ITEM: DOOR ASSEMBLY, WINGS AND MID FUSELAGE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) VENT SYSTEM
3) DOOR ASSEMBLY (4, 7)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
B[ ]
LOWER MID FUSELAGE (LMF) , PLD BAY
V070-384031
c [ ]
CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VENT DOOR LEAKAGE WILL ALLOW ORBITER STRUCTURAL_MPA_TMENT
PRESSURE DEGRADATION AND POSSIBLE HOT GAS ENTRY DURING
ASCENT/DEORBIT, WITH POSSIBLE THERMAL DAMAGE TO DOOR AREA.
FUNCTIONAL EFFECT OF LEAKAGE SHOULD BE MINIMUM TO VENT SYSTEM
OPERATION AND ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT INTEGRITY.
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REFERENCES:
_621-0043, V070-384031
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9050 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR ASSEMBLY, AFT FUSELAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) VENT SYSTEM
3) DOOR ASSEMBLY (8, 9)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-385031
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VENT DOOR ASSEMBLY HINGE BINDING WILL PREVENT ORBITER STRUCTURAL
COMPARTMENT VENTING, PRESSURIZATION/REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY.
FAILURE OF ALL VENT DOORS ASSOCIATED WITHIN THIS SPECIFIC
STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT LOCATION WILL PERMIT STRUCTURAL STRESS
AND POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
REFERENCES: ME621-0043, V070-385031
m
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REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
i
I
DATE: 9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT: 3/3 --
MDAC ID: 9051 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR ASSEMBLY, AFT FUSELAGE
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
I
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) PV&D
2) VENT SYSTEM
3) DOOR ASSEMBLY (8, 9)
4)
5)
6) Z
7) b
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES m
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 m
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 --
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-385031
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, TEMPERATURE, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VENT DOOR LEAKAGE WILL ALLOW ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT
PRESSURE DEGRADATION AND POSSIBLE HOT GAS ENTRY DURING
ASCENT/DEORBIT, WITH POSSIBLE THERMAL DAMAGE TO DOOR AND DUCTING.
FUNCTIONAL EFFECT OF LEAKAGE SHOULD BE MINIMUM TO VENT SYSTEM
OPERATION AND ORBITER STRUCTURAL COMPARTMENT INTEGRITY.
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REFERENCES: ME621-0043, V070-385031
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9052 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, WING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
VENT SYSTEM
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, ASCENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: / ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
WING/LMF
MC284-0539
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELIEF VENT DOOR FAILURE WILL PRECLUDE WING VENTING AND PRODUCE
WING STRUCTURAL STRESS. DOOR OPERATION IS ONLY REQUIRED AFTER
FAILURE OF THE ACTIVE VENT DOOR (7).
w
REFERENCES: SD72-SH-0101-5
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 9053 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, WING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
VENT SYSTEM
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, ASCENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: WING/LMF
PART NUMBER: MC284-0539
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz .............
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR FAILURE WILL PREVENT ORBITER WING AND
LMF COMPARTMENT ISOLATION ALLOWING CROSS VENTING AND
PRESSURIZATION. RELIEF VENT DOOR OPERATION IS ONLY REQUIRED
AFTER FAILURE OF THE ACTIVE VENT DOOR (7).
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9054 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, WING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
VENT SYSTEM
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, DESCENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING/LMF
MC284-0539
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELIEF VENT DOOR FAILUI_WILL PRECLUDE WING REPRESSURIZATION AND
PRODUCE WING STRUCTURAL STRESS. DOOR OPERATION IS ONLY REQUIRED
AFTER FAILURE OF THE ACTIVE VENT DOOR (7).
J
REFERENCES: SD72-SH-0101-5
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 9055 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, WING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
VENT SYSTEM
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, DESCENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING/LMF
MC284-0539
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR FAILURE WILL PREVENT ORBITER WING AND
LMF COMPARTMENT ISOLATION ALLOWING CROSS VENTING AND INHIBIT
REPRESSURIZATION. RELIEF VENT DOOR OPERATION IS ONLY REQUIRED
AFTER FAILURE OF THE ACTIVE VENT DOOR (7).
REFERENCES: SD72-SH-0101-5
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9056 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER, LMF/PLD BAY
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) PV&D
2) VENT SYSTEM
3) LMF/PLD BAY LINER
4) FILTER (6)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC286-0081
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FILTERS PROVIDE CONTAMINATION CONTROL IN THE PLD BAY. CLOGGED
FILTER WILL DEGRADE THE ABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE AND VENT THE PLD
BAY. FILTERS ARE LOCATED IN PLD BAY LINER SEPARATING THE LMF
FROM THE PLD BAY.
REFERENCES: V070-384031
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-57
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
PV&D FLIGHT:
9057 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHIELD, EMI
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) PV&D
2) VENT SYSTEM
3 ) VENT DOORS
4) SHIELD, EMI (16)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-384327
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
EMI SHIELDS LOCATED IN EACH VENT DOOR PROVIDE EMI PROTECTION AND
AL_WS_NTING- -SH_IELDDESIGN, LOCATION AND FUNCTION PREULDqgES
CLOGGING AS A FAILURE MODE.
REFERENCES: V070-385314
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/12/87
PV&D
9058
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT
FAILS TO CONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
ET/ORB PURGE SYSTEM
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
T-O UMBILICAL
MC276-0021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, WEARING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PURGE DISCONNECT IS UTILIZED DURING PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS TO
CONNECT THE ORBITER/ET PURGE SYSTEM TO THE GROUNDED SUPPLIED
PURGE GAS NETWORK. FAILURE WILL PRECLUDE THE CAPABILITY TO
SUPPLY GROUND PURGE GAS TO THE ORB/ET DISCONNECT. THE FAILURE IS
PRIOR TO ANY HAZARDOUS GAS APPLICATION AND CAN BE FIXED, MAY
CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
w
REFERENCES". MC276-0021
w
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9059 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT
FAILS TO DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
ET/ORB PURGE SYSTEM
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
T-O UMBILICAL
MC276-0021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORRISION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PURGE DISCONNECT IS UTILIZED DURING PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS TO
CONNECT THE ORBITER/ET PURGE SYSTEM TO THE GROUND SUPPLIED PURGE
GAS NETWORK. AUTOMATIC DISCONNECT AT T-O RETRACTION. THE
INTERFACE (ORB/GSE), HAS NO MECHANICAL CONNECTIONS, ONLY HELD
TOGETHER AT MOUNTING PLATES. FAILURE TO DISCONNECT DOES NOT
APPEAR AS A CERDIBLE FAILURE.
REFERENCES: MC276-0021
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9060 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
ET/ORB PURGE SYSTEM
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: T-O UMBILICAL
PART NUMBER: MC276-0021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PURGE DISCONNECT IS UTILIZED DURING PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS TO
CONNECT THE ORBITER/ET PURGE SYSTEM TO THE GROUND SUPPLIED PURGE
GAS NETWORK. LEAKAGE WILL DEGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY TO
SUPPLY PURGE GAS TO THE ET/ORB PLATE GAP CAVITY
ALLOWING CRYOPUMPING AND ICE FORMATION DURING PRELAUNCH.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/20/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9061 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET/ORB PURGE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
CLOGS, RESTRICTED F_W
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
ET/ORB PURGE SYSTEM
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : i/!
TAL: i/i
AOA: 1/1
ATO: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-385020/030/070
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE D STRIBUTION PR0vIDE9 su p£ E DP GE GAS TO
THE ET/ORB DISCONNECT. THE NETWORK OF TUBING, FLEX HOSES AND
ORIFICES PREVENTS CRYOPUMPING AND ICING OF THE ET/ORB DISCONNECT
DURING LAUNCH OPERATIONS. FAILURE WILL PREVENT/DEGRADE ........
FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY CAUSING POSSIBLE EXPLOSION DUE TO GAS BUILD
UP. POSSIBLE ICING CAN PREVENT ET/ORB SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: V070-385020/030/070
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9062 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET/ORB PURGE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PV&D
ET/ORB PURGE SYSTEM
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/I RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: I/i TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: / ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-385020/030/070
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PURGE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK PROVIDES GSE SUPPLIED PURGE GAS TO
THE ET/ORB DISCONNECT. THE NETWORK OF TUBING, FLEX HOSES AND
ORIFICES PREVENTS CRYOPUMPING AND ICING OF THE ET/ORB DISCONNECT
DURING LAUNCH OPERATIONS. FAILURE WILL DEGRADE FUNCTIONAL
CAPABILITY ALLOWING HAZARDOUS GASES INTO EXPLOSIVE ENVIRONMENT
AND ALLOW ICING OF ET/ORB SEPARATION MECHANISMS.
REFERENCES: V070-385020/030/070
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
i
i
m
w
9027
9031
9033
9035
9036
9037
9042
9043
9044
9046
9048
9050
9052
9054
9061
9062
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
i/I
i/I
2/2
2/2
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
1/1
I/i
ASCENT RELIEF VALVE
DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
DESICCANT/FILTER
OUTER CAVITY
DESICCANT/FILTER
OUTER CAVITY
TUBING
TUBING
TUBING
TUBING
DOOR ASSEMBLY, FORWARD
FUSELAGE
DOOR ASSEMBLY, PAYLOAD
BAY
DOOR ASSEMBLY, WINGS
AND MID FUSELAGE
DOOR ASSEMBLY, AFT
FUSELAGE
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT
DOOR, ASCENT
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT
DOOR, DESCENT
ET/ORB PURGE
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
ET/ORB PURGE
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
RESTRICTED FLOW,
CLOGS
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW,
CLOGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW,
CLOGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
FAILS TO OPEN,
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN,
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
CLOGS, RESTRICTED
FLOW
LEAKAGE
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